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I. INTRODUCTION
ON JUNE 3, 2013, an early-morning AirTran flight flyingfrom New York to Atlanta ended poorly for one of the
groups traveling.' Although the two sides are unlikely to agree
fully on the progression of events, it is alleged that the captain
of the AirTran flight summarily decided to deplane and deny
* Nicholas Poppe is a J.D. Candidate, 2014, at University of Denver Sturm
College of Law. He would like to thank Professor Rebecca Aviel, Bruce Lampert,
and Aaron Belzer for their unique and thoughtful contributions to this article.
1 Morgan Winsor, School Opens 'Investigation' After Airline Kicks Students off Plane,
CNN.com (June 4, 2013, 12:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/06/03/us/new-
york-students-off-plane/.
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service to 109 passengers.2 That decision is controversial be-
cause all 109 passengers deplaned were members of an Ortho-
doxJewish high school.' It took less than twenty-four hours for a
member of the group to make a discriminatory charge against
AirTran, a company owned by Southwest Airlines.' AirTran de-
fended its decision by noting that the cabin crew and pilot made
several requests for members of the group to comply with safety
regulations, namely taking their seats and turning off their
phones, but those requests were ignored.' Aside from the issue
of deplaning the entire 109-member group based on the actions
of a few, at initial glance, it appears that some crewmember in-
structions were in fact ignored, at least temporarily.' Neverthe-
less, the executive director of the school decided to open an
internal investigation, stating, "Preliminarily, it does not appear
that the action taken by the flight crew was justified."7 Funda-
mentally, the dispute can be characterized as one of discrimina-
tory animus versus the safety of air travel.
The situation described above is certainly not a catastrophe;
in fact, all of the students eventually reached their destination.8
The incident raises a larger issue, however-one that pits the
current aviation security framework against the rights of individ-
uals traveling throughout the United States to be free from dis-
criminatory practices. Not surprisingly, a large number of
discrimination allegations in forced deplaning, at least where
race is alleged as the discriminatory factor, are raised by Mus-
lims or individuals of Middle Eastern descent.' Indeed, over half
of the Muslims that participated in a comprehensive Pew Re-
search survey said that current anti-terrorism policies single out
Muslims, and 21% reported that they felt singled out by airport







8 David B. Caruso, AirTran Boots 100 Rowdy Students off NYC-Atlanta flight, USA
TODAY (June 4, 2013, 5:08 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/todayinthesky/
2013/06/04/airtran-boots-100-rowdy-students-off-nyc-atlanta-flight/2389599/.
9 See Muslim Americans: No Signs of Growth in Alienation or Support for Extremism,






the identity of the September 11, 2001 (9/11), hijackers and the
continued efforts of the United States to fight terrorism. Despite
the realities of the current political atmosphere, discrimination
in the context of airline safety has serious implications for trav-
elers, especially when carriers refuse passage to foreign trav-
elers." Passengers may be left stranded at the mercy of airlines
and are often forced to interact with law enforcement in foreign
countries, perhaps without the requisite language skills.12
The heightened scrutiny of this minority group naturally led
to a series of lawsuits against both private airlines and public law
enforcement agencies. An examination of federal case law
reveals numerous suits alleging that pilots engaged in discrimi-
natory practices when, citing "safety concerns," they removed
certain passengers and denied them further service." Here, the
plaintiffs alleged that the decision to remove them from the
flight was based not on their individual conduct, but rather was
motivated by their racial or ethnic identity." The majority of
these types of lawsuits are dismissed prior to a jury trial. 15
The principal reason why cases alleging discriminatory de-
planing are dismissed at an early stage is because the current
framework for analyzing a pilot's actions is very deferential to
the pilot.'" The statutory support for the heightened protection
of pilots is derived from 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b), which allows pi-
lots to refuse service to passengers that are deemed "inimical to
safety."' 7 The standard that courts apply in discriminatory de-
planing cases is whether the pilot's actions were arbitrary or ca-
pricious under the facts and circumstances known to the pilot at
the time of the incident." This standard, which is not stated any-
where in the statute, has been adopted by the vast majority of
courts, although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the ap-
propriate standard."9 This judicially created standard has been
tough for plaintiffs to meet in most situations and gives pilots
and airlines considerable advantage in eliminating lawsuits at
I1 See Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 875 (9th Cir. 2010).
12 Id.
13 Michael T. Kirkpatrick & Margaret B. Kwoka, Title VI Disparate Impact Claims
Would Not Harm National Security-A Response to Paul Taylor, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
503, 513-14 (2009).
'4 See id.
15 See id. at 514-15.
16 See Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1975).
17 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
is Williams, 509 F.2d at 948.
19 See Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2008).
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the summary judgment stage, notwithstanding plaintiffs' efforts
to provide objective facts that raise an inference of
discrimination.20
A pervasive problem recurrent in these lawsuits is the com-
plete foreclosure of constitutional remedies in favor of the
much lower arbitrary and capricious standard. 2 1 Although sev-
eral plaintiffs have cited the Fourteenth Amendment to chal-
lenge the purported discriminatory actions of airlines and
pilots, to date, no plaintiff has been successful in surviving sum-
mary judgment on a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.22 Plaintiffs have fared no better by
invoking the Fourth Amendment's protections against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.2 ' The primary reason for dis-
missing constitutional claims that allege civil rights violations is
that the decision of a private pilot to remove an individual from
a flight does not contain the requisite "state action."24
This article focuses on aviation-related cases that have fore-
closed a constitutional analysis of discriminatory deplaning and
also incorporates an original analysis based upon the Supreme
Court's current frameworks for finding state action. Part II
briefly outlines the current standard of scrutiny that courts ap-
ply to a pilot's decision to remove passengers. Part III analyzes
whether pilots should be considered state actors under any of
the traditional state action tests and under the natural exten-
sions of those tests.2 5
20 See Kirkpatrick & Kwoka, supra note 13, at 515.
21 Williams, 509 F.2d at 948 ("The test of whether or not the airline properly
exercised its power under [section] 1511 ... [is] whether or not the opinion and
decision were rational and reasonable and not capricious or arbitrary. . . ." (empha-
sis added)).
22 See Kirkpatrick & Kwoka, supra note 13, at 515.
23 See David Smith, Presumed Suspect: Post-9/11 Intelligence Gathering, Race, and the
First Amendment, 11 UCLA J. IsLumvc & NEAR E. L. 85, 126-27 (2012).
24 See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 21 (1883) ("Individual invasion of
individual rights is not the subject matter of the amendment.").
25 This article does not address whether a wronged plaintiff should plead a
cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a constitutional violation "under color
of state law" or whether a plaintiff would need to assert a Bivens action for a
deprivation of civil rights brought on by a federal official. Undoubtedly, this
would be a pertinent analysis for any potential plaintiff given the multitude of
state and federal actors in an airport setting, but it is outside the scope of this
article.
DISCRIMINA TORY DEPLANING
II. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK
This section provides a brief history of aviation security, but it
is limited to the foundational information needed for a proper
understanding of the main argument.
Pilots' authority to deplane or refuse passengers service and
simultaneously enjoy legal immunity for those actions is derived
from two sources. For domestic flights, in addition to the com-
mon law authority to protect passengers under a common car-
rier rationale," Congress granted pilots the statutory authority
to refuse service if they feel an individual "is, or might be, inimi-
cal to safety."2 7 For international flights, the authority is gov-
erned by the United States' ratification of the Tokyo
Convention of 1963, which allows for reasonable measures "to
protect the safety of the aircraft."2 To the extent that these laws
differ-and they do differ significantly on issues of preemption
and damages-they are largely irrelevant for the purposes of
this article. Due to the scintilla of case law citing the Tokyo Con-
vention, the vast majority of cases cited here are analyses of the
domestic statute, 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b).
In response to a series of high-profile airplane hijackings and
resulting deaths, Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.2 In addition to creating the Federal Aviation Agency
(later changed to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)),
Congress gave airlines the discretionary authority under 49
U.S.C. § 1511 (hereafter referred to as § 44902(b), where the
statute is currently codified under federal law) to deny service to
a passenger if that passenger might be "inimical to safety"; this
authority is sometimes known as "permissive refusal."3 0 The stat-
ute also grants the pilot immunity from civil liability if invoked
for appropriate safety concerns." Subsequent judicial interpre-
tations of the statute have added that an airline's decision
should be judged upon "the facts and circumstances of the case
as known to the airline . . . [and is] not to be tested by other
facts later disclosed by hindsight."S2 Some courts have gone even
26 See Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, 520 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008) (noting that
§ 44902(b) complemented existing air carrier duties under common law).
27 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006); see also Cerquiera, 520 F.3d at 12.
28 Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft art. 6, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941.
29 Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 946 (2d Cir. 1975).
30 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
31 See id.; Williams, 509 F.2d at 949.
32 Williams, 509 F.2d at 948.
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further and concluded that the statute is not an immunity from
civil liability, but rather is "an affirmative grant" of authority for
an air carrier to act in the interest of safety.33
By far the most important case interpreting § 44902(b) as it
pertains to the viability of claims made by individuals seeking
redress for discriminatory deplaning is the Second Circuit's de-
cision in Williams v. Trans World Airlines.14 In one of the first ap-
pellate decisions concerning § 44902(b), the court held in
Williams that the standard governing an airline's actions is
"whether or not the opinion and decision were rational and rea-
sonable and not capricious or arbitrary."3 ' The phrase "capri-
cious and arbitrary" does not appear in the statute itself, nor is it
mentioned in the rules upon which the court relied in setting
that standard.3 ' Despite the unsupported adoption of a standard
that is more often associated with review of government agency
decisions," every other circuit that has addressed this issue has
adopted an arbitrary and capricious standard for the domestic
statute. 38 This standard has made it difficult for plaintiffs to es-
cape summary judgment because the defendant's threshold is so
low.
The FAA made this threshold even lower with the promulga-
tion of an aviation regulation that states that the pilot in com-
mand is responsible for all decisions made on board the
aircraft.3 9 Courts that have harmonized this regulation with
§ 44902(b) have found that the pilot's actions and decisions are
the only germane factors to consider in determining whether a
deplaning was arbitrary and capricious.40 However, a pilot is sep-
arated from the passengers by the cockpit door, cannot leave
the cockpit during flight because of post-9/11 security proto-
3 Cerquiera v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 13-14 (1st Cir. 2008); Al-Watan v.
Am. Airlines, 658 F. Supp. 2d 816, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
34 See Williams, 509 F.2d at 948.
3 See id.
36 Id. at 948 n.9.
See Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 868 (9th Cir. 2010) (criticizing
the use of an arbitrary and capricious standard that is rarely employed outside of
government agency law).
3 Brief for Air Transp. Assoc. of Am., Inc. and Int'l Air. Transp. Assoc. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 23-24, Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621
F.3d 858 (2010) (No. 10-962).
3 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (2014).
40 See Al-Watan v. Am. Airlines, 658 F. Supp. 2d 816, 824 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
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cols, and must necessarily rely on the reports of the flight crew."
Thus, the pilot often receives only a partial view of a problem
onboard and makes a decision to deplane passengers based
upon limited knowledge of the events in the cabin. 2 Ironically,
a pilot that is ignorant as to what is actually occurring in the
aircraft cabin and that relies on the potentially exaggerated re-
ports of flight attendants is afforded more protection than if he
had done his own independent investigation.4 3 That is, a pilot is
under no duty to independently assess a security risk and is im-
mune from liability even when flight attendants make unreason-
able or false representations about the potential threats of
passengers.4 4 Because the standard under § 44902(b) does not
allow courts to test a pilot's decision by hindsight, even the most
egregious misrepresentations by flight attendants are not scruti-
nized because the pilot is unaware of the true security threat or
lack thereof. 5
Following the passage of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,
Congress passed two legislative enactments that are not only rel-
evant to passenger rights but also critical to an analysis of state
action.
First, the Air Transportation Security Act of 1974,6 which
mandated that all passengers be screened for weapons and ex-
plosive devices prior to boarding a commercial aircraft, required
airlines to refuse service to any passenger who was unwilling to
go through a security checkpoint (mandatory refusal). After
the 1974 changes, Congress reorganized the statutory frame-
work to place mandatory refusal (codified at 49 U.S.C.
§ 44902(a)) in the same section as permissive refusal (codified
at 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b)). 4 8 Relevant to the state action inquiry
discussed in Part III, the 1974 Act did not require state or fed-
eral employees to conduct security screenings. 9 In fact, private
41 Jordan Campbell, Note, "Get Off My Plane": The Need for Extreme Deference to
Captains and Crews on International Flights Under the Tokyo Convention of 1963, 77 J.
AIR L. & COM. 367, 401 (2012).
42 Id.
4 See Al-Qudhai'een v. Am. W. Airlines, 267 F. Supp. 2d 841, 847-48 (S.D.
Ohio 2003); Christel v. AMR Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 335, 340 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
44 Al-Qudhai'een, 267 F. Supp. 2d at 848.
45 Id.
4 Air Transportation Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-366, § 1111(A), 88
Stat. 409, 418 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44902(a) (2006)).
4 Id.
48 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902.
4 Air Transportation Security Act § 316.
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corporations did a bulk of the screening at major airports in the
United States.5 0 Argenbright Security, a private screening firm,
had 25,000 employees and was responsible for screening at
forty-four U.S. airports.5' Although local and state police were
present to supplement private screenings, government involve-
ment after 1974 was neither direct nor comprehensive. 2
The world, not just aviation security, was changed by the Sep-
tember 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the
Pentagon. In direct response to the 9/11 attacks, on November
19, 2001, Congress passed the second piece of legislation rele-
vant to the state action inquiry: the Aviation and Transportation
Security Act (2001 Act).5 3 The 2001 Act created the Transporta-
tion Security Administration (TSA), which is under the control
of the Department of Transportation.5 4 The 2001 Act turned the
then-current aviation security model on its head by supplanting
private and state security apparatuses with a completely federal
screening system. 5 The TSA was charged with the responsibility
of screening all passengers and property that originated at do-
mestic airports. 6
Not only did the 2001 Act create a federal regulatory system
for aviation security, but it also mandated federal involvement at
every airport that is required to screen passengers and prop-
erty.5 7 And although screening is a separate issue from de-
planing, they are logically related given that (1) the 2001 Act
did not change permissive refusal under § 44902(b); and (2)
the current framework requires airlines to comply with TSA
screening procedures, from initial security checkpoints all the
way to the gate.5' A federal uniformed official is required to
oversee every screening operation and has the summary power
to dismiss any individual who is part of the screening system,
50 Greg Fulton, An Airport Screener's Complaint, TIME (Aug. 17, 2006), http://
content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1228247,00.html.
51 Id.
52 See id.; see also Statute and Regulation History, TRANsp. SEC. ADMIN. (Dec. 12,
2012), http://www.tsa.gov/stakeholders/statute-and-regulation-history.
53 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
54 Id. § 114.
55 See id.
56 Id.
57 See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(b) (2006).
58 See id. § 44902(a) (requiring airlines to deny service to anyone who does not
pass through, or refuses to pass through, security).
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government actor or not.59 Thus, Congress envisioned that air-
craft security would not simply come under federal regulatory
scrutiny, but rather that the federal government would adopt
screening and passenger safety as part of its responsibility to pro-
tect the American public.o
It is under this framework that Part III analyzes whether pilots
should be considered state actors while engaging in discretion-
ary deplaning.
III. STATE ACTION
As stated in the introduction, most courts have been hostile to
extending the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment to law-
suits based on discriminatory deplaning. Since pilots are private
actors working for private corporations, their actions do not fall
under constitutional scrutiny unless the requisite level of state
action is found.' Each of the following subsections will analyze
the different tests the Supreme Court has crafted when analyz-
ing whether private actors should be constrained by the Consti-
tution. A cause of action based upon the Constitution is
appealing in the context of discriminatory deplaning because it
would heighten the scrutiny placed on a pilot's decision. Instead
of relegating claims to the arbitrary and capricious standard, the
potentially discriminatory decisions would be analyzed using the
much higher levels of scrutiny the Supreme Court has utilized
for the Equal Protection Clause."
It is well established that a private individual may be subject to
liability for deprivation of another's rights secured by the Con-
stitution if the appropriate level of state action is found." Plain-
tiffs that allege sufficient state action are then capable of suing
private individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of
constitutional protections like those granted in the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause."
The Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test to determine
whether deprivation of a constitutional right can be "fairly at-
tributable" to the state." First, "the deprivation must be caused
by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the
59 Id. § 44901(b).
60 See generally Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
61 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1982).
62 See id.
63 See id. at 939.
64 Id. at 935.
65 Id. at 937.
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[s] tate."6 6 Second, "the party charged with the deprivation must
be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor."6 7 In the
context of discriminatory deplaning, the first element of this test
is readily satisfied because there is no question that § 44902(b)
is a federal grant of authority that vests discretionary power in a
pilot to deny transportation services." The deprivation comes in
the form of the right to air travel, which is a federal statutory
right expressly granted in 49 U.S.C. § 40103; the Supreme Court
and other courts have consistently upheld the constitutional
right to freedom of movement." Moreover, citizens have a fed-
eral statutory right to be free from discrimination in air travel.o
The second element of the "fairly attributable" test is where
most plaintiffs fail in the context of discriminatory deplaning.
The Supreme Court has articulated a number of tests to deter-
mine whether a particular action by a private individual should
be considered state action." Although each of the tests repre-
sents a unique approach to analyzing state action, "[o] nly by sift-
ing facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious
involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true
significance."7 2 Taking each test in turn, the author will start
with the "public function" exception that originated in Marsh v.
Alabama." Second, the author will briefly address the theory of
government compulsion and show how the current statutory
framework in aviation forecloses this path. Third, the author will
analyze and argue for the good-faith extension of the joint par-
ticipation theory outlined in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.74 Lastly,
the author will apply Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority's
public entwinement or symbiotic relationship test, 5 despite the




68 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006); Responsibility and Authority of the Pilot in
Command, 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (2014).
69 See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966); see also Latif v. Holder,
No. 3:10-CV-00750-BR, 2013 WL 4592515, at *9 (D. Or. Aug. 28, 2013).
70 See 49 U.S.C. § 40127.
71 Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 939 (1982).
72 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961).
73 See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946).
74 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 931-32.
75 See Burton, 365 U.S. at 725-26.
76 The other exceptions to the state action requirement simply do not apply in
this context. The judicial intervention exception found in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), has been limited by subsequent rulings to race-based covenants
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A. THE PUBLIC FUNCTION TEST
In Marsh v. Alabama, the Supreme Court held that a private
corporation that owned an entire town was subject to the same
constitutional constraints as a public town." Admittedly, the
public function exception has become a high bar to meet, and
subsequent cases have foreclosed certain areas from constitu-
tional scrutiny." The public function test has also been judi-
cially modified in modern day jurisprudence to be the
"exclusive [ ] public function" test." The holding of the Su-
preme Court in Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks limited a finding of
state action to instances where the conduct was exclusively
within the realm of government control.80
It is this tough standard by which courts must scrutinize the
actions of pilots." Essential to the public function exception,
however, is a specific articulation of the actual conduct being
analyzed. 2 Discriminatory deplaning does not involve regulat-
ing the airline industry or making a business decision, but
rather involves the conduct of pilots who invoke their authority
to make determinations about safety." Thus, the public func-
tion analysis hinges on whether a pilot's discretionary authority
to deplane individuals is conduct normally reserved for govern-
ment actors." Unfortunately, there is very little case law regard-
ing whether a pilot's discretionary decisions regarding safety
constitute state action. The following argument will instead
compare other types of private conduct that have been weighed
by courts considering the public function exception.
With a security/safety function in mind, one logical starting
place is to analogize cases where private individuals exercising
and, regardless, would not be applicable in a larger context here. The final ex-
ception, conspiring with government officials to deprive an individual of his or
her rights, could gain traction in certain circumstances, although a specific set of
facts would need to be present. In an effort to espouse broader principles that
encompass a multitude of fact patterns, this exception has been omitted.
77 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 508-10 (1946).
78 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982) (declining to find state
action in discharge or transfer decisions of nursing homes); Rendell-Baker v.
Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 841-42 (1982) (dismissing an argument that a private school
was a state actor under the public function test).
79 Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158-60 (1978).
80 Id.
81 See id.
82 Id. at 164.
83 Id. at 158-60.
84 See id.
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law enforcement power have been held to constitutional stan-
dards. Pilots may question, investigate, and potentially detain
passengers on the flight while they assess a potential security
threat; these types of actions are customarily reserved to state
actors." Thus, as it relates to their authority under § 44902(b),
pilots are similar to other types of private law enforcement ac-
tors because they operate under a statutory grant of authority-
like the authority of private bank guards or casino security
guards-and have the ability to conduct quasi-criminal investiga-
tions normally associated with law enforcement."
Federal appellate courts have generally been cautious in ex-
tending the public function exception based solely on an indi-
vidual's use of traditional law enforcement techniques.8 ' The
mere investigation of a crime or security concern, without more,
does not transform an individual into a state actor.8 " An Eighth
Circuit opinion, United States v. Garlock, is factually comparable
to the actions of a pilot and is helpful in the public function
analysis. In Garlock, a private bank security guard conducted an
investigation of a bank teller regarding a shortage of money. 0
The teller, after being interrogated by two private fraud experts,
admitted to embezzlement; after the information was turned
over to the police, she was subsequently tried and convicted."
On appeal, she asserted in part that the investigation should
have been subject to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments given
that a criminal investigation was a traditional public function.9 2
Her argument carried weight because a federal regulation re-
quired banks to develop programs for identifying thefts and
mandated reporting to the proper federal agency." Thus, the
defendant-appellant attempted to portray the security officer
and fraud examiners as extensions of law enforcement bodies."
The Eighth Circuit held that simply investigating potential
crime does not rise to the level of public function needed to
impose constitutional restrictions. 5 Highly relevant to the
85 See, e.g., Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir. 2008).
86 See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44902(b), 44941 (2006); see, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 21.11 (2014).
87 See United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443-44 (8th Cir. 1994).
88 Id.
89 See id.
90 Id. at 442.
91 Id.
92 Id.
9s Id. at 443 (referencing 12 C.F.R. § 21 (1993)).
94 Id.
95 See id. at 443-44.
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court's holding was that the bank's actors were motivated by
their own pursuit of protecting bank assets, not by a desire to
vindicate the public or the state."
Other circuits have followed this line of reasoning, finding
the context and motivations of the private actors to be relevant
in analyzing public functions but downplaying the importance
of the actual law enforcement techniques employed." The
Tenth Circuit tracked this reasoning in Gallagher v. Neil Young
Freedom Concert, holding that private security guards who con-
ducted pat-down searches were acting pursuant to company pol-
icy in furtherance of their own security interests, despite the fact
that the concert took place on government property and was
overseen by public law enforcement.98 This holding further rein-
forces the notions presented in Garlock that (1) the public func-
tion exception, in terms of law enforcement powers, must be
analyzed by looking at the motivations of the private actors and
whether such conduct is a natural arm of law enforcement's
goal of protecting the public interest; and (2) the actual law en-
forcement techniques employed are less relevant.9 9 This is not
to say that a particular technique is never germane to the analy-
sis, but it is simply less important when analyzing whether the
public function exception applies.'
As applied to commercial airlines, decisions like Garlock and
Gallagher seem to foreclose a finding of state action, at least from
a law enforcement perspective. The authority under § 44902(b),
as stated previously, was an outgrowth from the common carrier
96 See id. at 444.
9 See Johnson v. LaRabida Children's Hosp., 372 F.3d 894, 897-98 (7th Cir.
2004); Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442, 1457 (10th Cir.
1995); State v. Sanders, 448 A.2d 481, 485-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982);
People v. Houle, 13 Cal. App. 3d 892, 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970). But see Warner v.
Grand Cnty., 57 F.3d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding a private actor liable
under § 1983 for conducting a strip search because it was a "search power which
has been traditionally reserved for the states").
98 See Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1457. This is in no way meant to diminish potential
state law causes of action against private individuals, including: assault, battery,
false imprisonment, and defamation. Although outside the scope of this article,
but still relevant to the remedial focus on passenger rights, the Airline Deregula-
tion Act, 49 U.S.C. § 41713 (2006), preempts a large number of these claims,
hence the focus on finding a constitutional answer. See, e.g., Smith v. Comair,
Inc., 134 F.3d 254 (4th Cir. 1998) (passenger claims of breach of contract, false
imprisonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress were preempted
by the Airline Deregulation Act).
9 See Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1457.
100 See Warner, 57 F.3d at 964.
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rule that required airlines to remove passengers that potentially
threatened the safety of other passengers.' The duty incum-
bent on common carriers is a duty owed to passengers, not to
the FAA or federal law enforcement figures.1 0 2 Section 44902(b)
also does not require reporting to federal officials, nor does it
require airlines to detain passengers until they are handed over
to law enforcement."os Thus, even when performing certain law
enforcement functions, like investigations, airlines are con-
cerned more about their own pecuniary interests and the safety
of their passengers than the goals of law enforcement, like ap-
prehending potential security threats.o
One potential factor that distinguishes deplaning cases from
those like Garlock and Gallagher is that the regulatory framework
as a whole, not just the power under § 44902(b), makes a pilot's
decision appear to contain a mixed motive-in other words, the
pilot's decision does not seem focused purely on the airline's
private interest. Post-9/11 security protocols placed greater em-
phasis on aircraft safety and crew training. 0 5 The 2001 Act
grants immunity to airline personnel if they report suspected
security threats to TSA or law enforcement.' Airlines are also
required to adopt security policies that are often proposed or
drafted by the federal government.o'0 Although heavy govern-
ment regulation, or even government endorsement of a private
actor's activities, cannot sustain a finding of state action under
the public function exception, a totality of the circumstances
could indicate a hybrid of interests in the current aviation secur-
ity framework. 0
Unfortunately, courts have addressed comprehensive regula-
tory frameworks in other contexts and often hold that private
actors lack a sufficient connection to an exclusive public func-
tion, despite a potential law enforcement motive. 09 In an inter-
101 Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 520 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2008).
102 See id.
03 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
104 See Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 8 (noting that the pilot testified about lost revenue
and disruption to flight, not interests of law enforcement in capturing
individuals).
105 See Campbell, supra note 41, at 400-01.
106 See 49 U.S.C. § 44941.
107 See Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d. 765, 792 (D. Minn.
2009).
108 See Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 41 (1999); Jackson v.
Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
10- See State v. Sanders, 448 A.2d 481, 485-86 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 1982).
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esting comparison, casinos have faced similar lawsuits where
plaintiffs argued that the public function exception applied to
certain employee conduct because of the security powers
granted to casino personnel.o In State v. Sanders, a criminal
case where the defendant argued for suppression under the
Fourth Amendment, casino security guards detained and
searched an individual they suspected of card counting."' The
search yielded a foreign substance, which the security guard and
a law enforcement officerjointly tested for cocaine.' 12 A positive
test for cocaine led to the individual's arrest.11 3
The defendant in Sanders argued that the security guards were
state actors for the following reasons: (1) they were exercising
authority normally granted exclusively to law enforcement; (2)
the security guards had such authority under New Jersey's Ca-
sino Control Act; (3) they had authority to detain individuals
suspected of violating gambling regulations; and (4) casinos
were required by the state to have detailed security proce-
dures.114 Thus, the statutory framework for casino security per-
sonnel is similar to the current aviation security framework for
discriminatory deplaning, given the mandate for aircraft secur-
ity, the authority to act as a pilot, and immunity for reporting
and acting."' Despite the extensive government directives, the
court in Sanders overruled a lower judge's decision that found
state action.' In support of its ruling, the court held that the
regulatory directives did not confer state action upon the secur-
ity guards, and even if they did, the guards exceeded such au-
thority when they subjected the individual to a search. Once
again, the court found it highly relevant that the guards were
acting in the pecuniary interest of the casino, even if they ulti-
mately had a close connection with law enforcement. 1 8
Another pair of recent casino cases analyzing whether private
actions fall under the public function exception in highly regu-
lated industries is probative of how courts distinguish between
private action and state action in the context of security
110 See id. at 483-84.
111 Id. at 482.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 483.
114 Id. at 486.
115 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006); see also 49 U.S.C. § 44941 (2006).
116 See Sanders, 448 A.2d at 485-86.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 486.
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frameworks. In Romanksi v. Detroit Entertainment, the court did
find that casino security guards were state actors because they
were licensed under Michigan law and had "plenary arrest au-
thority."' 19 For purposes of determining whether the public
function exception should apply, the court divided relevant case
law into two categories: (1) where private actors exercised some
police authority related to their employer's interest (partial
framework); and (2) where private actors had the same author-
ity as police officers (full framework) .12o Less than a year later,
the same court held that similar detention tactics did not consti-
tute state action because, despite heavy government direction of
the gaming industry, the particular guards implicated in that
lawsuit did not have plenary arrest authority.121
The authority granted to pilots falls within the line of cases in
which private actors are granted some authority, but not plenary
power to arrest.122 While it is true that the captain of an aircraft
has the final say on any aspect of the flight and may deviate from
any established protocol when necessary,'12  the regulatory
framework and § 44902(b) confer only the authority to deny
passage, not a broader authority to act as a law enforcement of-
ficer while parked at the gate or in the terminal. 2 4 And even
though in a certain number of circumstances a pilot may engage
in the very activity that is normally reserved for law enforcement,
such as a citizen's arrest, 2 5 no argument can be made that the
language of 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) grants authority beyond air-
craft safety.126 Thus, under the current framework, a pilot's law
enforcement abilities simply do not confer the responsibility
necessary to find state action under the public function test.
119 Romanski v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C, 428 F.3d 629, 639 (6th Cir. 2005).
120 Id. at 637-38.
121 See Lindsey v. Detroit Entm't, L.L.C., 484 F.3d 824, 829-30 (6th Cir. 2007).
122 See id.
123 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (2014).
124 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
125 See Lee v. Town of Estes Park, 820 F.2d 1112, 1114 (10th Cir. 1987) (hold-
ing that citizen's arrest by a private actor did not automatically transform that
individual into a state actor).
126 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b).
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B. DOES THE 2001 AvIATION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ACT CHANGE THE PUBLIC FUNCTION ANALYSIS?
It is possible that the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
of 2001, enacted by Congress post-9/11,127 opened up another
avenue through which to find state action under the public
function test. As previously stated, the 2001 Act completely sup-
planted private screening at major airports in favor of screening
done by federal employees and security personnel.12" In addi-
tion to screening, the 2001 Act authorized and deployed federal
marshals on both domestic and international flights, with spe-
cial emphasis on high-risk flights, including those operated by
the long-haul, heavy, fuel-laden planes that were used on 9/
11.12" Although the air marshal program existed prior to 9/11,
at the time of the September 11th attacks, only thirty-three
agents were employed.' Although the exact number of current
agents is classified, an educated guess made in 2004 estimated
that about 6,000 agents were employed.'"' Congress also en-
acted legislation that concerned airport perimeter fencing, tech-
nical changes to flight-deck doors and access, and crew training
for recognizing and communicating potential threats.'32 Thus,
TSA screeners represent only a fraction of the government's in-
volvement in the current aviation safety scheme.
It is plausible that the 2001 Act is so comprehensive that it has
actually led Congress to "adopt" aviation safety as a public func-
tion. This argument focuses on whether aviation security, as an
entire theme, has come under the blanket of federal control.
The Supreme Court has already spoken on similar issues, find-
ing that heavy government regulation does not transform a pri-
vate actor into a state actor.133 In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., the Court rejected an argument that extensive regulation of
industry led to a finding of state action, thus shielding a wide
area of business activity from constitutional scrutiny.' The fol-
127 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597
(2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
128 See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(b).
129 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act; see also Samantha Levine, The
Marshals' Cloudy Skies, U.S. NEWS (Nov. 21, 2004), http://www.usnews.com/us-
news/news/articles/041129/29marshals_2.htm.
130 Levine, supra note 129.
131 Id.
132 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
133 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350-51 (1974).
134 See id.
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lowing argument would seek to distinguish Jackson by arguing
that aviation safety is no longer a "regulated industry";"' rather,
the 2001 Act effectively led the federal government to adopt the
vital aspects of aviation security. Thus, Jackson, which only speaks
to heavy or comprehensive regulation, does not preclude an
analysis that aviation security in post-9/11 America has been
completely subsumed by the federal government and is now sub-
ject to constitutional scrutiny.1 36
An extensive search has yielded very little addressing the idea
of the federal government "adopting" something as a public
function, which is not surprising given that it takes an extraordi-
nary event to spur Congress into such comprehensive legisla-
tion. Even then, it is rare for Congress to completely supplant an
entire industry and create cabinet-level organizations out of
whole cloth, such as it did with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and TSA, which combined now employ over
290,000 people."3 Any analysis of whether federal "adoption" of
an activity would constitute public function is therefore rele-
gated to what the Supreme Court would likely hold. The follow-
ing three cases, although not factually comparable to aviation
security, present a viable argument in support of what the au-
thor coins the "adoption theory."
The first case, Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts,
was a per curiam opinion in which the United States Supreme
Court invalidated a college board of trustee's decision to deny
two black individuals admission solely on the basis of race.13 8 In
upholding the board's decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that because the college was initially established by a
private trust, the private individual therefore had the right to
dispose of his estate at his leisure."' The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court wrote, "[I] t is wholly impossible to conceive that the do-
nors and testators had the slightest idea in appointing the city as
a trustee of their charitable trusts that it could ever be con-
tended that they were thereby subjecting their trusts to the gov-
135 See id.
136 See id.
137 See Career Areas, TRANsp. SEC. ADMIN., http://www.tsa.gov/careers (last vis-
ited Apr. 18, 2014) (noting that the TSA currently employs 50,000 officers, in-
spectors, and marshals); see also About DHS, DEP'T HOMELAND SEC., https://www.
dhs.gov/about-dhs (last visited Apr. 18, 2014) (noting the 240,000 individuals
currently employed by the DHS).
I3 Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230, 231 (1957).
139 In re Girard's Estate, 127 A.2d 287, 291 (Pa. 1956), overruled by Bd. of Dirs. of
City Trusts, 353 U.S. at 231.
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ernmental powers of the city."' The U.S. Supreme Court
wholly disagreed and found state action because when Penn-
sylvania chose to oversee the trust under a state agency, its ac-
tions instantly became subject to the constraints of the
Fourteenth Amendment.1 4'
In the second case, Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, the U.S.
Supreme Court found state action where a government agency
evaluated a private transit company's decision to play music
across their transit system.14 2 The Court grounded its state ac-
tion theory solely on the basis of the Public Utilities Commis-
sion's substantial surveillance and involvement in the private
company's activities.'4 3 The Court found it highly relevant that
an investigation had been ordered and that the public commis-
sion had subsequently approved of the private company's deci-
sion.' 4 4 Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. would later distinguish
Pollak on the grounds that the action in Pollak was much more
active, and that the government eventually approved of the pri-
vate actor's decisions.' 4 Thus, at least during the time period in
which Pollak and, subsequently, Jackson were written, the state
action analysis could have hinged on whether the role of the
government was active or passive.14 6
The final case, and the most famous of the three, is Evans v.
Newton, in which the Court invalidated a city's decision to
change from public to private park trustees.'17 The city's re-
moval of public trustees was an attempt to enforce the wishes of
the individual that dedicated the park.14 8 The Supreme Court
invalidated the city's decision because the history of public
maintenance and oversight had made the park "an integral part
of the [c]ity.""' Using language particularly pertinent to the au-
thor's proposed adoption theory, Justice Douglas wrote, "The
momentum it acquired as a public facility is certainly not dissi-
pated ipso facto by the appointment of 'private' trustees."5 o Ev-
ans therefore stands for the notion that when a government
140 Id. at 295.
141 Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. at 231.
142 Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1952).
143 See id. at 462.
144 Id.
145 SeeJackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 356-57 (1974).
146 See id.
147 See Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 302 (1966).
148 Id. at 297.
149 Id. at 301.
150 Id.
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entity takes responsibility for a particular establishment, the na-
ture of that establishment may change, despite its private incep-
tion, such that it warrants the protection of the Constitution.15 1
The upshot of these three cases is that when a government
agency accepts ownership of an entity and involves itself in the
entity's regulatory machinery in a way that amounts to some-
thing more than passive guidelines, the nature of that entity may
eventually take on a public character.15 2 The author contends
that such a "perfect storm" has occurred in the aviation security
context.
The 2001 Act is truly comprehensive legislation that sup-
planted private actors in favor of government regulation. The
increased use of air marshals and the development of all-inclu-
sive safety regulations aimed at almost every aspect of flight op-
erations makes the current regulatory framework much more
worthy of a public function analysis.' 5 3 Moreover, the placement
of federal TSA and DHS employees as active participants in avia-
tion security is similar to the active roles played by the govern-
ment agency and city in Pollak and Evans.15' The 2001 Act is
radically different from the conduct in Jackson and instead is
more like that in Pollak. The government is not using passive
regulation to control and slow the growth of certain business
activities; it has decided that an active federal solution is more
valuable than continued regulation of private companies.'5 5
It is conceded that private airlines still possess a dominant
role in aviation safety, but the courts in Board of Directors of City
Trusts and Evans admitted that private actors were still impli-
cated in the contexts of college admissions and park manage-
ment.1 5 6 However, the continued activities and motivation of the
private companies were not dispositive in those cases; the deter-
minative factor was the role that the government had stepped
into and the subsequent changes to those private entities.'" Avi-
ation security is no different. Section 44902(b) may continue to
151 See id. at 302.
152 See id. at 301.
153 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
154 See id.; Public Utilities Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1952); Ev-
ans, 382 U.S. at 297.
155 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act; Jackson v. Metro Edison Co.,
419 U.S. 345, 356-57 (1974); Pollak, 343 U.S. at 462-63.
156 See Evans, 382 U.S. at 296; Pennsylvania v. Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353
U.S. 230, 231 (1957).
157 See Evans, 382 U.S. at 301; Bd. of Dirs. of City Trusts, 353 U.S. at 231.
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confer discretion upon private pilots to deplane individuals, but
the totality of the circumstances indicates that the federal gov-
ernment has accepted and adopted aviation security in response
to the 9/11 attacks.1 5 8
It is questionable whether the current Supreme Court's juris-
prudence would accept such a theory as that posited above. Ad-
mittedly, in a battle of the case law, Jackson has been far more
influential than Pollak.' 59 However, the rationale in Evans may
provide a window for a future decision under the public func-
tion exception.' If the "momentum" of federal aviation secur-
ity oversight continues to grow, and perhaps increasingly focuses
on gateway and in-flight security, then a court may be able to
sustain a finding of state action based on the federal govern-
ment's "adoption" of a public function.'6 1
C. THE GOVERNMENT COMPULSION TEST
A finding of state action under the government compulsion
test requires more than approval or government acceptance of a
private decision.16 2 The government must compel the private ac-
tor to engage in the specific conduct for which a plaintiff is com-
plaining. 6 ' In the context of aviation security and the powers
conferred to pilots under 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b), the analysis is
fairly short: permissive refusal, by its very nature, is a discretion-
ary grant of authority that vests control in the pilot.16 4 The exer-
cise of independent judgment is fatal to a finding of state action
under the compulsion test for almost any set of facts.16 5
D. THE JOINT-ACTION TEST
The joint-action test for analyzing state action, as articulated
in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.1 66 and Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co.,'6 7 imputes state action to private actors when they are "will-
ful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents." 6 8
158 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act.
159 jackson has been subsequently cited by almost 2,500 cases, compared to 500
case citations to Pollak.
10 See Evans, 382 U.S. at 302.
161 See id.
162 See Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 164 (1978).
161 See id. (distinguishing between compulsion and the refusal to act).
164 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
165 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004-05 (1982).
166 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).
167 Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
168 Id. (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966)).
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In the context of aviation security, courts must adapt the analysis
slightly. In a search of the case law, nothing has yielded a case
involving a situation where a state actor was present at the exact
point a pilot decided to deplane an individual. Even then, since
Congress vested the authority under § 44902(b) with the pilot,
not public law enforcement authorities, the actual pilot's deci-
sion is a poor place to look forjoint action. Instead, this section
focuses on perhaps the more serious situation that inevitably de-
velops after a decision to deplane a passenger is made: a deten-
tion and interrogation by police. A survey of case law reveals that
a number of deplaned passengers are immediately subjected to
some form of seizure or questioning upon their ejection from
the aircraft.' The quick and fluid nature in which police take
individuals into custody raises the question of whether passen-
gers are subject to unlawful seizures at the behest of private
pilots. 170
The joint-action test is traditionally associated with statutes
that provide private creditors with the power to repossess or
seize the property of a debtor, normally with an accompanying
law enforcement officer."'7  However, the joint-action test has
been applied in other contexts, assuming the private conduct is
"fairly attributable" to the state.' 7 2 Tests developed in lower
courts are quite stringent, requiring that the state have an offi-
cial statutory policy or working relationship that transfers the
power of the state to a private actor."' The mere invocation of
statutory authority by a private actor, without a mandate to do
so, does not transform an individual's actions into state ac-
tion. 7 4 Even a statutory scheme that vests some authority in the
state but also allows for the exercise of independent judgment
by private actors is not conclusive under the joint-action test. 7 5
In the context of unlawful seizure by a private party, the cir-
cuits have similar tests, but the language tends to differ slightly.
For example, the Third and Fifth Circuits will allow private ac-
169 See, e.g., Rubin v. United Air Lines, Inc., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 113 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
170 Obviously, to sustain a claim, it must actually be proven that any seizure was
unlawful. This article does not attempt to reconstruct the sufficiency of probable
cause, but rather focuses on who made the decision: the police or the pilot.
171 See Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939.
172 See Price, 383 U.S. at 794-95; see also Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
173 See Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 82 (3d Cir. 1984).
174 See Ibrahim v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 538 F.3d 1250, 1257 (9th Cir. 2008).




tors to be sued as state actors when: "(1) the police have a pre-
arranged plan with the [private entity], and (2) under the plan,
the police will arrest anyone identified [by the private entity]
without independently evaluating the presence of probable
cause.""' The Eighth Circuit employs a test that asks whether
the decision is "tantamount to substituting the judgment of a
private party for that of the police or allowing the private party
to exercise state power.""' The circuits are in agreement that a
private actor does not engage in state action simply by exercis-
ing his right to call the authorities.1 7 8 Nor will state action apply
if the officers relied in part on, or were directed to, an individ-
ual that they subsequently arrested, as long as they performed
their own probable cause analysis.17 9 Given the slightly broader
scope of the Eighth Circuit's language, the following analysis
will rely on that test.
It is conceded that of all the potential avenues to finding state
action in the aviation context, the joint-action test is the most
fact dependent."s Not every invocation of deplaning results in
arrest or detention, and in the cases that do result in seizure, the
police do not always fail to exercise independent judgment.18 1
The following three cases are meant to provide an example of
what is suspected to be a larger trend in the interaction between
pilots and law enforcement.
1. Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways-The Implied Inference
Shqeirat v. U.S. Ainvays provides a good analysis of joint action
because the plaintiffs sued both the airline and the law enforce-
ment officers for unlawful seizure.18 2 Briefly, the plaintiffs were
six Muslim passengers departing on a flight from Minnesota.'8 3
Several passengers and flight attendants expressed reservations
176 Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 765, 789-90 (D. Minn.
2009) (quoting Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1984)) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
177 Id. at 790 (quoting Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 870 (8th Cir. 2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
178 See Young, 284 F.3d at 870; Ibrahim, 538 F.3d at 1257.
179 Bartholomew v. Lee, 889 F.2d 62, 63 (5th Cir. 1989); Cruz v. Donnelly, 727
F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1984).
180 See Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting
that although the pilot wanted the passengers arrested, the police and TSA de-
clined to prolong the passengers' detention after conducting an investigation).
181 See id.
182 See Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 781, 791.
183 Id. at 771.
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about their conduct, but a district court later found the alleged
suspicions to be wholly inadequate, indicating that race may
have been a factor in the decision-making process.' The plain-
tiffs were nevertheless deplaned on the captain's orders, then
subsequently searched, handcuffed, transported to a separate lo-
cation, and interrogated for several hours by law enforce-
ment.1 8 5 When analyzing the officers' actions, the court denied
the defendant officers' request for qualified immunity, stating
that none of the officers made a probable cause analysis and
that the law was clearly established at the time that such conduct
was unconstitutional.8 6
The judge then addressed the plaintiffs' claim that U.S. Air-
ways had acted jointly in the unlawful arrest.'18 The court de-
nied the occurrence of any joint action because the officers had
done "an independent (albeit cursory) investigation."'8 8 So in
the same court order, law enforcement did not conduct a proper
investigation such that they were potentially liable under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, but they did conduct an investigation such that
U.S. Airways was not liable as ajoint actor.'"9 The question then
naturally arises: if the officers' independent investigations were
inadequate or even nonexistent, then upon what information or
persuasions did the officers rely on to justify the arrest in their
own minds? The only logical conclusion is that the officers took
the pilot and flight crew's apprehensions at face value and took
the defendants into custody because the pilot forced them to deplane.
The order of the trial court supports this conclusion.'9 " The
flight attendants offered information regarding the pre-flight
prayers by the plaintiffs and reported to the police that the re-
quest for seatbelt extensions was of concern."' The officers sub-
sequently arrested the individuals without asking why those
actions were suspicious.' 9 2 In short, it appears that the flight at-
tendants' report, coupled with the deplaning itself, were all that
the officers needed to justify their own actions.
184 Id. at 786, 789 (questioning the "suspicion" raised by the innocuous request
for seatbelt extenders by two of the plaintiffs, especially since one of them was
completely blind and posed no legitimate threat to the safety of the aircraft).
185 Id. at 772-74.
186 Id. at 786-88.
187 Id. at 789.
188 Id. at 790.
189 See id.
190 See id. at 791.
191 Id. at 774.
192 See id. at 786.
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Applying the test from the Eighth Circuit, this is the paradig-
matic example of an instance where the officers' actions were
tantamount to substituting their judgment for that of a private
party.1 3 The trial court pointed to the fact that the pilot never
explicitly directed law enforcement to arrest the passengers. 1 9 4
This ignores the totality of the circumstances. A pilot's decision
to remove a passenger is, by itself, a communication that some-
thing is seriously wrong.1 9 5 When officers fail to conduct their
own independent investigation, they are necessarily relying on
the advice of the pilot, even if the pilot does not clarify his inten-
tions.19 The only other explanation, and the one apparently
adopted by the judge in Shqeirat, is that the officers randomly
and arbitrarily arrested the individuals."' Having more faith
than that in law enforcement, the more viable explanation is
that the officers simply followed the lead of the pilot by effectu-
ating the arrests after the deplaning. The failure to find joint
action in these types of situations effectively immunizes pilots
and airlines from constitutional scrutiny, even when they sup-
plant the decision-making role of law enforcement.
2. Al-Watan v. American Airlines-The "Logical Extension"
In Al-Watan v. American Airlines, a series of questionable acts
by passengers led the pilot to return to the gate and request the
presence of law enforcement. 98 Although the court was careful
to say that the flight attendants only pointed out the questiona-
ble individuals, the police separated the men, all of Arab de-
scent, from the rest of the passengers and interrogated them for
several hours.'"9 In a four-sentence analysis, the district judge
dismissed the joint-action claim, finding that there was no indi-
cation that the pilot or crew ever directed the conduct of the
police. 200 However, a careful reading of the judge's findings of
fact and of the defendant's own admissions points to the oppo-
site conclusion.
While analyzing the plaintiffs' racial discrimination claim for
refusal to transport, the court noted that "Captain Plummer did
193 See id. at 791.
194 Id.
195 See 14 C.F.R. § 121.537(d) (2014).
196 See id.
197 See Shqeirat, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 791.
198 See Al-Watan v. Am. Airlines, 658 F. Supp. 2d 816, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2009).
199 Id.
200 See id. at 829.
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not decide that Plaintiffs should be refused transport-just inter-
viewed by police before reboarding."o2 1 The defendant airline sup-
ported this decision by stating in its trial brief, "Captain
Plummer's decision to have plaintiffs questioned by law enforce-
ment in the gate area is inextricably intertwined with, and the logi-
cal extension of his decision to return the aircraft to the gate."202
Thus, the defendant airline in this case justified the conduct of
the crew by arguing that the logical next step after deplaning
under § 44902(b) was for the police to interrogate the individu-
als.20 3 No probable cause was ever found; in fact, the police re-
leased the individuals after their detention and interrogation.0 4
But the defendant airline exercised state power, in that it used
the police as a tool to further the investigation of its own suspi-
cions, and then it defended its actions on the very grounds that
it involved the police in their investigation!20 5 Once again,
under the Eighth Circuit's test,2 06 this is an ideal case to illus-
trate a private party's exercise of state power in cooperation with
government actors.20 7
Airlines cannot use the police as both a sword and a shield. If
airlines are going to deplane individuals, which raises serious
concerns by itself, and then turn them over to police to further
the investigation, courts must consider a pilot's actions as a "log-
ical extension"2 08 of the law enforcement process. It is incum-
bent upon officers to make their own probable cause analysis,
but when an airline requests such an investigation and the pi-
lot's preliminary investigation is taken at face value, pilots
should not escape liability as state actors. The implicit communi-
cation to law enforcement that deplaning evinces is too strong
to warrant any other interpretation. The pilot has already exer-
cised significant statutory discretion under § 44902(b),209 but
not every pilot will have the confidence to explicitly inform law
enforcement that individuals should be arrested. Courts must
address the underlying implications of deplaning and realize
that a pilot's invitation for law enforcement to board the plane
201 Id. at 828 (emphasis added).
202 Id. at 822 (emphasis added).
203 See id.
204 Id. at 820.
205 See id. at 822, 827-28.
206 See Shqeirat v. U.S. Airways Grp., Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 765, 789-90 (D.
Minn. 2009).
207 See Al-Watan, 658 F. Supp. at 830.
208 See id. at 822.
20o See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
138 [ 79
DISCRIMINA TORY DEPLANING
or question those already deplaned is strong encouragement for
law enforcement to arrest or detain and therefore implicates pi-
lots in joint action.
3. Cerqueira v. American Airlines-Concurrent Investigations
The final case, Cerqueira v. American Airlines, involved the re-
moval of three men from an aircraft and their subsequent de-
tention by police.2 1 0 The suspicious passengers were initially
removed at the captain's request so that the authorities could
question them further."' Police officers removed the men with-
out an independent probable cause analysis and detained them
in a separate area of the terminal, away from the other passen-
gers. 1 This captain, unlike the previous captains, was not shy
about continuing his investigation of the suspicious passengers
while the police began their own investigation.21 3 The captain
personally interviewed a passenger who reported that TSA
agents had confiscated a box cutter from one of the detained
men; the captain later stated that (under his authority as pilot)
"[the] aircraft was not going to fly the entire day no matter what
was checked" by the TSA.2 14 After consulting with the Massachu-
setts State Police and the TSA on the matter, the captain de-
cided to deplane all the passengers, sequester them in a secured
area of the terminal, and have the aircraft searched with dogs.
Law enforcement took advantage of the sequestration by re-in-
terviewing the individuals who had raised suspicion with the cap-
tain.21 During the pendency of those interviews, the captain
held discussions with American Airlines support staff, the police,
TSA agents, and air marshals.
By the time the case went before ajudge, there was apparently
some confusion as to who even made the determination to deny
the passengers travel.2 1" The pilot unequivocally stated that the
state police had made the decision. 2 1 9 A plaintiff, however, had
received a response from American Airlines nine days after the
210 Cerqueira v. Am. Airlines, 520 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2008).
211 Id.
212 Id. at 7-8.
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incident that stated that "the airline had 'fully reviewed the deci-
sion' to deny boarding and explained that it was because 'our
personnel perceived certain aspects of your behavior which could
have made other customers uncomfortable."'o2 2 The letter, as
reproduced in the First Circuit's opinion, mentioned nothing
about the state police involvement in this determination."' Un-
fortunately, this particular plaintiff did not add the state police
as defendants, nor did he claim civil rights violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, so we are without the benefit of a joint-action
analysis.2 2 2
Nevertheless, this case demonstrates why courts should find
joint action when both private and state actors necessarily rely
on each other's statutory authority to perform an investigation.
Obviously, the initial determination is made under the pilot's
discretionary authority pursuant to § 44902(b). 2 23 The investiga-
tion then must turn to law enforcement officers who are vested
with the authority to conduct criminal investigations. Courts are
trying to draw a distinct line that separates the private authority
from the public authority. In the case just described, and proba-
bly in other cases, the line is nonexistent, and the airline contin-
ues its own investigation during the pendency of the law
enforcement questioning, most likely supplementing the find-
ings of law enforcement. 224
Given the gravity of air safety in the post-9/11 context, it is
simply unrealistic to assume that calling on law enforcement in a
deplaning situation is the same as a storeowner calling the cops
on a suspected shoplifter. 2 25 Although private parties in other
contexts are granted discretionary authority by the government
or by treaty, courts have observed that pilots have significantly
greater responsibility. For example, one court even surmised
that pilots have "de facto and dejure law enforcement authority
when the plane is in the air."2 26 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit
held that one of the reasons flight crews were not given unfet-
tered discretion in the Tokyo Convention was the fear that pas-
220 Id. at 10 (emphasis added).
221 Id.
222 See id. at 4.
223 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
224 See Cerqueira, 520 F.3d at 7-8.
225 See Cruz v. Donnelly, 727 F.2d 79, 81 (3d Cir. 1984) (noting that the police
were following the ordinary course of conduct in investigating a simple com-
plaint by a private actor).
226 Eid v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 621 F.3d 858, 875 (9th Cir. 2010).
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sengers would simply be handed to the authorities and stranded
without recourse.m Courts must therefore recognize that under
the unique framework governing deplaning, the actions of pi-
lots and law enforcement are so necessarily interrelated that
there will be very few instances where the two parties do not join
together to reach a conclusion. Such conduct cannot be distin-
guished from the joint action originally complained about in
Lugar.22 8
E. THE SYMBIOTIc RELATIONSHIP TEST
The final test for state action, often coined the "symbiotic re-
lationship" test, originated in the Supreme Court case, Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authoity.2 29 In Burton, a parking garage
owned and operated by a Delaware state agency decided to rent
out extra space to private tenants.23 o One of the tenants, Eagle
Coffee Shoppe (Eagle), leased a space within the parking garage
and opened a restaurant.23 1 In the initial agreement, the govern-
ment agency agreed to construct the necessary utilities, and Ea-
gle invested a substantial sum to make the space suitable for a
restaurant.232 In exchange for the space and utilities, Eagle
would pay an annual rent of approximately $30,000.233 After
opening, Eagle enforced a discriminatory policy that excluded
black individuals from patronizing the restaurant.2 4
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the restau-
rant, through its direct financial relationship with the state, was
subject to the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. 3 In a decision that overturned the Delaware Supreme
Court, the United States Supreme Court found relevant a num-
ber of factors that inescapably led to the conclusion that Eagle
was a state actor: (1) the land and building that contained the
restaurant were publicly owned; (2) the leased space was inte-
gral, in fact vital, to the financial health of the state's parking
garage; (3) the maintenance of the building was the state's re-
sponsibility; and (4) the private and public parties mutually ben-
227 Id.
228 See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982).
229 365 U.S. 715, 724-26 (1961).
230 Id. at 719.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id. at 720.
234 Id.
235 Id. at 721.
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efited from each other's business."3 In particularly poignant
language, Justice Clark wrote, "It is irony amounting to grave
injustice that in one part of a single building, erected and main-
tained with public funds by an agency of the State to serve a
public purpose, all persons have equal rights, while in another
portion, also serving the public, a Negro is a second class citizen
"237
It is conceded that the symbiotic relationship test developed
in Burton has not garnered much subsequent attention from the
courts, nor has the Supreme Court relied on its holding in any
other case analyzing state action. 3 Nevertheless, the symbiotic
relationship theory has been utilized in several aviation con-
texts, and those cases are illustrative of how a court might rule
when faced with a deplaning issue.
As a short background, state or local governments own almost
all large commercial airports in the United States.23 9 The vast
majority of these airports are financially self-sufficient, in that
they do not draw on a local tax base.24 0 The costs of constructing
and maintaining the airport are paid by leases negotiated with
airlines, restaurant revenues within the airport, and parking
fees. 241
One of the first cases to apply the symbiosis analysis from Bur-
ton in the aviation context was Adams v. City of New Orleans, a
federal district court case that was adjudicated just over a year
after Burton was decided. 4 In Adams, a private corporation
under a lease agreement provided food services within a public
airport.2 43 The government agency did retain some discretion in
the quality of food served, its price, and the retention of employ-
ees.24 4 One particular restaurant was racially segregated and
black individuals subsequently sued, asking the court to enjoin
the discrimination pursuant to Burton."4 The court granted the
injunction, finding that Burton firmly applied because the leas-
236 Id. at 723-24.
237 Id. at 724.
238 IvAN BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE LEVINSON, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CIVIL RIGHTS LIABILHY § 1:4 (2013), available at Westlaw STLOCCIVIL.
239 Airports Q&A, AIRLINES FOR AM.: WE CONNECT THE WORLD, http://www.air-
lines.org/Pages/Airports-QA.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
240 Id.
241 Id.
242 SeeAdams v. City of New Orleans, 208 F. Supp. 427, 429-30 (E.D. La. 1962).
243 Id. at 430.
244 Id.
245 Id. at 428.
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ing arrangement with the government was almost identical to
the lease in Burton.2 4 6 The government was directly profiting
from the increased revenue derived from the restaurant owner's
discriminatory conduct.4 7 The defendant argued that the space
was "surplus" property that was not necessary to the airport op-
erations, and that the private retailer had invested significant
sums of money in the space. 24 8 The district court found these
defenses without merit.2 49 The Fifth Circuit affirmed per
curiam, finding the defenses "patently frivolous." 250
In a more recent Seventh Circuit case, the court addressed
whether a private advertising company's refusal to display cer-
tain objectionable content within the airport violated the Consti-
tution.25 1 The city of Chicago had paid for the construction of
the displays, was responsible for their maintenance, and charged
the private company commission in exchange for the advertis-
ing space.2 5 2 The lease also alluded to some authority that the
city could exercise in objecting to certain conduct.25 3 Both the
city of Chicago and the private advertising company objected to
an advertisement that was critical of United Airlines, although
the private company made the ultimate decision on the contro-
versial advertisement.254 The court held that the decision of the
private corporation was subject to constitutional constraints be-
cause both the private party and the city of Chicago had a vested
financial interest in the advertising space and because both had
objected to the plaintiffs proposed content.255
Not all courts have been willing to extend Burton to the avia-
tion context; the Sixth Circuit has been particularly hostile.2 5 6 In
one example, a plaintiff argued that a private search by an air-
line employee was unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.2 57 The court dismissed the argument that it should apply
246 Id. at 430.
247 Id.
248 Id. at 429.
249 Id. at 430.
250 City of New Orleans v. Adams, 321 F.2d 493, 493 (5th Cir. 1963).
251 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Dep't of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1147
(7th Cir. 1995).
252 Id. at 1149.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 1150.
255 Id.
256 See, e.g., Wagner v. Metro. Nashville Airport Auth., 772 F.2d 227 (6th Cir.
1985).
257 Id. at 228.
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a mechanical and simple analysis every time a private corpora-
tion leased space from the government.258 In order to place con-
stitutional restraints on a private party, the court required the
existence of a substantial relationship between the parties.2 59
The need for a substantial relationship is supported by previous
and subsequent Supreme Court decisions in which the Court
required the plaintiff to show that the relationship was more
than contractual-that the government in some way actually
benefited from the alleged conduct.200 Thus, the holding of Bur-
ton has been limited to those instances where the plaintiff can
show that the state directly profits from the actual discriminatory
conduct.261
The jurisprudence of the Sixth Circuit seems more in line
with recent Supreme Court decisions, namely those that are hos-
tile to extending the Constitution to private actors. 62 Any po-
tential plaintiff in the aviation context must then show that the
government is actually profiting from an airline's discriminatory
actions, thus demonstrating the "symbiotic relationship" alluded
to by the Sixth Circuit.2 " The difficulty is finding a relationship
between discriminatory deplaning and the effect that it has on
the profits of public airports. The profit alluded to in Burton,
however distasteful, was that a certain segment of the white pop-
ulation found a segregated restaurant appealing.2 6 4 White indi-
viduals who preferred a segregated restaurant would enter the
Eagle Coffee Shoppe after parking their cars in the govern-
ment's garage.265 The argument in Burton was that an integrated
restaurant would cause business to suffer, which would in turn
affect the parking structure.266 In the aviation context, although
the argument is still about discrimination, the connection to the
airport's profit is simply more attenuated.
Airport revenues were certainly affected by the 9/11 terrorist
attacks. Boston Logan International Airport experienced a 19%
258 Id. at 229.
259 See id. (noting "the necessity of a close nexus between the state and the
challenged conduct").
20 See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457
U.S. 830, 840-41 (1982); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974).
261 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 238, § 1:4.
262 See id. (noting that "the Supreme Court has been generally reluctant to
treat the action of private parties as that of the state").
263 See Wagner, 772 F.2d at 229.
264 See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724 (1961).
265 See id. at 719.
266 Id. at 724.
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drop in passenger usage from fiscal year 2001 to 2002, and
Washington Dulles International Airport's annual financial re-
port from 2003 revealed an increased cost in daily security mea-
sures due to heightened federal requirements and alerts.267 The
difficulty is attaching these losses or profits to discriminatory de-
planing. The conduct in Burton was simply more pronounced
and invidious; profits rose for both the garage and the restau-
rant when discrimination was enforced.6 8 In the aviation con-
text, not every passenger of Middle Eastern descent is denied
passage, and there is no indication that even a minority of pas-
sengers are unwilling to fly with individuals of Middle Eastern
descent. To show the requisite level of symbiosis between public
profits and pilot deplaning, a plaintiff would have to show that
an airline's refusal to carry Middle Eastern passengers actually
boosts an airport's appeal to customers. In that context, the air-
port would in fact benefit from discrimination, and the ratio-
nales from Burton and the aforementioned cases would be
relevant. Such an allegation cannot be proven, and perhaps is
simply not true.
Although promising in theory, the symbiotic relationship is
simply too attenuated in the aviation security context, and more
importantly, the theory has been distinguished and narrowed by
too many courts. 269 Even without the theory's subsequent con-
striction, the facts of cases like Adams v. City of New Orleans and
Air Line Pilots Ass'n, International v. Department of Aviation of Chi-
cago demonstrate a clear connection between the discriminatory
conduct and the alleged effect on profits.2 7 0 In the context of
discriminatory deplaning, due to its relatively infrequent occur-
rence and lack of direct economic impact, plaintiffs will con-
tinue to struggle to find the connections that were so probative
in those previous cases.
267 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report: Logan Airport, MASS. PORT AUTH.
(Nov. 15, 2002), http://www.massport.com/media/8037/Comprehensive%20
Annual%20Financial%2OReport%20-%2OYear%20Ended% 20June%2030,%2020
02.pdf; 2003 Comprehensive Annual Financial Report: Significant Economic Events,
METRO. WASH. AIRPORTS AUTH. (Mar. 30, 2004), http://www.metwashairports.
com/file/cafr03.pdf.
268 See Burton, 365 U.S. at 724.
269 BODENSTEINER & LEVINSON, supra note 238, § 1:4.
270 Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. Dep't of Aviation of Chi., 45 F.3d 1144, 1149
(7th Cir. 1995); Adams v. City of New Orleans, 208 F. Supp. 427, 430 (E.D. La.
1962).
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IV. CONCLUSION
The previous sections indicate at least two viable avenues for
finding state action in a pilot's discriminatory deplaning: public
function and joint action. The 2001 Act was so comprehensive
in scope and detail that it is plausible that the federal govern-
ment has adopted aviation security as a public function.271 Pilots
operating under that authority then become natural extensions
of that authority. Alternatively, several examples borne out of
recent cases indicate that pilots are often acting in concert with
local law enforcement, blurring the lines between private and
public actors. A continued refusal of courts to recognize such
joint action effectively immunizes pilots' actions from constitu-
tional scrutiny.
The emphasis placed on finding state action, thus allowing for
constitutional review, is motivated principally by the watered-
down standard that currently applies to a pilot's actions. The
arbitrary and capricious standard from Williams72 not only
avoids review of the facts but also prevents juries from ever de-
ciding whether a particular pilot's actions were justified or dis-
criminatory. As stated in earlier sections, pilots have unbridled
discretion to determine what is "inimical to safety," 273 and courts
have been unwilling to second-guess those decisions under the
arbitrary and capricious standard.7 Constitutional scrutiny
would afford a better balance than is currently struck between
pilots and passengers. Instead of viewing a pilot's conduct
through an arbitrary or capricious lens, pilots would be forced
to justify their actions under the Fourteenth Amendment's
Equal Protection Clause standards. Alternatively, passengers
could seek relief under the Fourth Amendment's protection
from unreasonable searches and seizures. Constitutional scru-
tiny would not interfere with the legitimate safety concerns of
pilots; rather, it would simply ensure that such concerns were
actually legitimate and not borne out of underlying discriminatory
animus. The Constitution seems particularly suited to remedy
the injustice found in discriminatory deplaning, and hopefully
271 See Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat.
597 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
272 See Williams v. Trans World Airlines, 509 F.2d 942, 948 (2d Cir. 1975).
273 See 49 U.S.C. § 44902(b) (2006).
274 See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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this article demonstrates that constitutional scrutiny is war-
ranted, and perhaps even mandated, based upon the authority
enjoyed by pilots under federal law.
IttAS, 
Speeches
BODis
A
04tAS, It*
